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First Solution: a safety-first plan backfires 
 
HE First Solution disaster has much deeper roots than is currently 
appreciated – and by no means all of them run back to 
Bangladesh. There are good reasons to suppose that the British 
Government might also have a hand in these developments. For years, 
migrants in Britain have been looking for cheap,  efficient and reliable 
ways of sending money back to relatives overseas. 
 
Using a bank has always been expensive, and the  money can take months to 
arrive. So settlers began to devise their own strategies. The money’s arrival made a 
big difference. New houses could be built, children educated, and elders requiring 
medical treatment at last had the funds they needed. At first, few outsiders noticed, 
but in recent years specialists in economic development began to wake up to the 
potential of these cash flows. For many Third World countries, the amount of money 
sent back home by migrant workers far exceeds that sent by rich countries 
as development aid. 
 
In 2001, the World Bank and Britain’s Department for International Development 
(DFID) realised that making the most of the potential of migrant remittances was as 
important a means of eliminating poverty as was overseas aid, and began to 
commission research into such matters. As a result, a major international conference 
was held in Dhaka in June 2003, and the papers delivered there (including my own) 
appeared in a book published by the University of Dhaka in 2005.  
 
But unknown to the contributors, both the DFID and the World Bank were losing 
interest in devising schemes to maximise the developmental potential. A new priority 
emerged: ensuring that the migrants’ own carefully constructed and highly efficient 
value transfer networks were not surreptitiously used by terrorists and drug 
smugglers. Not that there was any evidence this was happening. Rather, post-9/11 
hysteria led to a supposition that if these networks could be used for such purposes, 
then they must be. As a result, DFID launched a major programme to persuade 
everyone to send their money home through ‘approved’ channels, instead of through 
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OVER the past two weeks, the Advertiser has both broken and led the 
story about the collapse of money transfer business First Solution. As 
police finally probe possible wrongdoings, thousands of immigrant 
Bangladeshi workers remain millions of pounds out of pocket. After 
reading our investigations, DR ROGER BALLARD, Director of the Centre 
for Applied South Asian Studies at Manchester University and a former 
Government adviser, wanted to add his views. He asks whether our own 
Government might be at least partly to blame.
migrants’ own trust-based informal networks. Yet although the programme was 
primarily driven by post 9/11 security concerns, DFID’s public relations justified it 
differently. They suggested that value transfers through approved ‘formal’ channels 
would be cheaper, and above all safer, than those sent through unregulated informal 
channels.  
 
In a further initiative, not widely publicised, DFID funded a £7.5million programme to 
help the Central Bank of Bangladesh set up the financial infrastructure required to 
ensure the bulk of incoming remittances would pass through ‘formal’ rather than 
‘informal’ channels. At much the same time in late 2005, First Solution Money 
Transfer Ltd appeared from nowhere. It soon opened agencies in almost every city 
with a significant Bangladeshi population, and heavily advertised the superiority of its 
services in Bengali TV channels and newspapers in Britain. 
 
First Solution also had exceptional success in Bangladesh: it set up transfer 
arrangements with virtually every banking institution in the country.These people 
were evidently extremely well connected, so much so they were able to set up 
precisely the kind of formally organised money transfer system DFID recommended, 
and which its agreement with the Bank of Bangladesh was designed to promote. 
However, there was one big difference. The ‘informal’ networks most people had 
hitherto used had grown out of their own communities and were run 
by people they knew and trusted. But First Solution was quite different: like all 
‘formal sector’ initiatives, it expanded from the top down. It also had all sorts of 
official backers in Bangladesh and Britain, and operated through a network of limited 
companies registered at Companies House. It was just the kind of ‘more reliable’ 
enterprise DFID was seeking to promote. 
 
But no matter how formally constituted such a value transfer business may be, it is 
only as reliable as the people who run it. The people who ran First Solution were 
undoubtedly well connected, but they were not drawn from the Sylheti communities, 
whose members their enterprise set out to serve. Rather, they were ‘bhadralog’ from 
Dhaka. How much loyalty did they turn out to have to the ‘small fry’ who sent their 
money through First Solution?  
 
Beyond that, some much wider questions also need to be asked. Would First 
Solution have been so successful 
if it had not been given a fair wind by the Bank of Bangladesh—and indeed by 
DFID? Could it be that First Solution was the first fruit of DFID’s £7.5million effort to 
make remittance transfers ‘cheaper and safer’ for members of Britain’s Asian 
communities? 
 
If so, their experiment has been costly. Hindsight suggests everyone would have 
been much better off without the efforts of DFID’s system to fix something they did 
not understand. Worse, the people they were trying to help have lost a lot of money. 
There is an urgent need to ensure that what went wrong is properly investigated. If it 
shows British Government initiatives – of omission or commission – were at least 
partially responsible for the growth and collapse of First Solution, it should at least 
consider making good the financial damage of those who lost out. 
 
